We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically, in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower quality. Among other things, we show for any distribution of quality that there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) many economists have studied the market failures due to asymmetric information in an otherwise perfectly competitive market.
The standard model studies a static market with atomistic agents whose valuations depend on quality and a standard result is that only low quality goods are traded (if at all) even if the buyers are willing to pay more than the reservation price of sellers for each individual quality (see also, Wilson, 1979 Wilson, , 1980 . This so-called lemons problem affects a large spectrum of markets, including insurance markets. In many cases, including the classic second-hand car market, the good under consideration is a durable good.
Durability introduces two complicating factors in the used goods markets: goods not traded in any period can be offered for sale in the future and, in addition, new cohorts of potential sellers may enter the market over time. Roy (1999a, 1999b) have investigated some of the issues that arise when durability is explicitly taken into account in a dynamic model. Janssen and Roy (1999a) address the issue whether a given stock of goods can be traded over time. They show that in any dynamic competitive equilibrium all goods eventually will be traded. The main idea behind this result is that low quality sellers have less incentives to wait (before selling) compared to high quality sellers. Once certain (low) qualities are sold, only relatively high qualities remain in the market. Consumers can predict that sellers of different qualities will sort themselves into different time periods and, hence, they are willing to pay higher prices in later periods. The equilibrium is thus one in which higher qualities are sold in later periods at higher prices. Janssen and Roy (1999b) address the same issue in the context of markets where identical cohorts of goods with uniformly distributed quality enter the market over time.
In such markets, the infinite repetition of the static equilibrium under adverse selection is an equilibrium in the dynamic model. In fact, it is the unique stationary equilibrium and also the only equilibrium where prices and average quality traded are (weakly) monotonic over time. They show that there exists at least one other equilibrium, however, where all goods are traded within finite time after they have entered the market. These equilibria are cyclical in prices and quantities in the sense that once all goods are traded, prices (and quantities) will fall. Up to the moment all goods are sold, however, the dynamic process of prices and quantities is monotonically increasing.
In this paper we extend the analysis of Janssen and Roy (1999b) in a number of ways. First, we relax the assumption that in every period a cohort of uniformly distributed qualities enters the market. Instead, we allow for any arbitrary distribution, which satisfies some mild regularity condition. Second, our results are stronger in the sense that we show the existence of an infinite number of equilibria, where all goods are traded within finite time after they have entered the market. Finally, we show the extent to which the uniform distribution is special. It turns out that for a set of values of the model's parameters and a set of distributions, which have relatively little probability mass in the neighborhood of the static equilibrium, it is impossible to construct a dynamic equilibrium with monotonically increasing prices and quantities up to the moment everything is sold. We provide an example where this is the case.
Hence, the equilibrium construction for the uniform distribution does not extend naturally to the class of all distributions.
Other existing literature 1 on adverse selection has focused on various processes (such as signaling and screening) through which the difficulties of trading under asymmetric information may be resolved and has emphasized the role of non-market institutions in this context (such as certification intermediaries and leasing). This paper, in contrast, is motivated by a more basic issue which also underlies the original Akerlof paper viz., the functioning of the price mechanism in a perfectly competitive market when traders have private information. It is important to understand the nature of market failures due to adverse selection before analyzing the role of institutions in mitigating these failures.
Our specific model is as follows. We consider a competitive market for a perfectly durable good where potential sellers are privately informed about the quality of the goods they own. Each period, a cohort of sellers of equal size and with an identical, but arbitrary, distribution of quality enters the market. The demand side is modeled in the following simple way. Buyers are identical, have unit demand and for any given quality, a buyer's willingness to pay exceeds the reservation price of a seller for that quality. As buyers do not know the quality, their willingness to pay in a period equals the expected valuation of goods traded in that period. Moreover, there are more buyers than sellers in each period so that in equilibrium, prices equal the expected valuation. Once traded, goods are not re-sold in the same market.
2
The Akerlof-Wilson model can be considered the static version of our model. The adverse selection problem implies that in equilibrium only a certain range of low qualities is traded. The infinitely repeated version of a static equilibrium outcome is also an equilibrium in our dynamic model. Hence, the issue of existence of dynamic equilibria is easily resolved. In this dynamic equilibrium high quality goods remain unsold forever.
We concentrate on the existence of other equilibria with more interesting properties -where prices and average quality traded fluctuate over time. We provide a characterization result saying that in all such equilibria the range of quality, which is eventually traded in the market, exceeds that in the stationary (static) outcome.
Moreover, sellers of different qualities within each cohort of entrants separate themselves out over time. As the use value of low quality goods is lower than that of high quality goods, low quality sellers sell earlier than high quality sellers, the owner of a good with lower quality trades earlier, owners of higher quality goods wait longer.
In order to highlight the waiting aspect of the adverse selection problem and also to make clear the sharp contrast between the properties of equilibria of our model with those of the static model, the main part of the analysis is devoted to proving the existence of an infinite number of equilibrium where every potential seller entering the market trades within a certain finite number of periods after entering the market.
The results obtained in the paper provide a different perspective on the adverse selection problem. In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, the adverse selection problem manifests itself in the fact that relatively high quality goods cannot be traded despite the potential gains from trade. In the dynamic market for durable goods, the lemons problem is not so much the impossibility of trading relatively high quality goods, but rather that sellers with relatively high quality goods need to wait longer in order to trade. 3 So, the cost of waiting becomes an important factor in the welfare loss arising due to asymmetric information.
There are three important intertemporal factors in the market which determine the market dynamics in all the non-stationary equilibria of our model. First, once a certain range of quality is traded, only sellers of higher quality goods are left in the market, which tends to improve the distribution of quality of potentially tradable goods in the future. Second, the entry of a new cohort of potential sellers with goods of all possible quality dilutes the average quality of potentially tradable goods -as they cannot be distinguished by buyers from higher quality sellers left over from the past. Finally, as time progresses and stocks of untraded goods accumulate from the past, the new cohort of traders entering the market in any period becomes increasingly less significant in determining the distribution of quality of tradable goods.
4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, the equilibrium concept and some preliminary results. Section 3 provides a characterization result.
The main result of the paper relating to the existence of an infinite number of equilibria where all goods are traded within finite time after entry into the market are outlined in section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
3 There are certain situations in which the fact that a seller has waited for a long time might indicate low rather than high quality. This would be true, for example, when the buyers can inspect quality -high valuation buyers are more likely to inspect and select the relatively high quality houses -leaving unsold goods of relatively low quality for later periods (Taylor, 1998) . A paper with a similar spirit is that of Vettas (1997). As stated earlier, our model is designed to understand the nature of the lemons problem and so we do not allow for any technology which can directly modify the information structure. 4 If there is no entry of sellers after the initial period, or equivalently, if buyers can distinguish the period of entry of sellers in the market, then only the first factor is relevant. In that case, it has been shown earlier for fairly general distributions of quality (see, Janssen and Roy (1998) ) that in every equilibrium all goods are traded in finite time. Vincent (1990) analyzes a dynamic auction game with similar features.
Model.
Consider a Walrasian market for a perfectly durable good whose quality, denoted by θ , varies between θ and θ , where
. Time is discrete and is indexed by 
, which is independent of t . We assume that ( ) θ µ is strictly increasing and absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
The measure of all sellers who enter the market in each period is strictly positive,
. Each seller i knows the quality i θ of the good he is endowed with and derives flow utility from ownership of the good until he sells it. Therefore, the seller's reservation price is the discounted sum of gross surplus due to ownership and we assume that it is exactly equal to i θ . So, the per period gross surplus is ( ) i θ δ − 1 .
Each time period t a set of buyers, with measure larger than ( ) θ µ , enters the market. All buyers are identical and have unit demand. A buyer's valuation of quality θ is equal to θ v , where 1 > v . Thus, under full information, a buyer's valuation exceeds the seller's. All buyers know the ex ante distribution of the sellers with respect to qualities but do not know the quality of the good offered by a particular seller.
When a buyer buys a good he leaves the market forever. All players discount the future with common discount factor δ , 1 0 < < δ . They are risk neutral and rational agents.
We will denote expected quality of the good from seller i conditional on the fact that he belongs to a certain subset
, this value is defined for all
and it follows that ( ) ( ) ( ) 
The set of time periods in which it is optimal to sell for a seller i is given by
will also sell in that period. This fact allows us to define for each period a marginal seller t θ as the seller of the highest quality in period t . It also allows us to define t s as the surplus of the marginal seller in period t , i.e.,
This part of the Proposition 3.1 basically follows from the fact that the use value of low qualities is lower than the use value of high qualities so that low qualities are more ready to sell.
The second part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal sellers in any period make non-negative net surplus. This implies that the other sellers make strictly positive surplus.
The third part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal seller in period t is indifferent between selling in period t and selling in the first future period in which a quality larger than his own quality is sold. Prices in that future period will be higher, reflecting higher average quality, but the discounted surplus is such that the seller is indifferent.
The last part of the Proposition 3.1 says that if it exists the highest quality that will ever be sold in any dynamic equilibrium is either equal to θ or it is such that the seller makes zero surplus. It is clear that if a seller makes zero net surplus, prices in all future periods cannot be higher as this seller will have an incentive to wait and sell in that future period. The Proposition 3.1 argues that if the highest quality sold in a dynamic equilibrium makes strictly positive surplus, then it must be equal to θ .
Proposition 3.1 (equilibrium characterization). Any dynamic equilibrium has the following properties. 
the marginal seller in period t is just indifferent between selling in that period and in the first next period where marginal quality is larger than his own quality.
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The above definition does not imply the existence of an equilibrium sequence.
However, it easy to see that there exists at least one equilibrium sequence, namely 
such that for all
such that:
• for all
Proposition 4.3 basically says that if we have constructed an equilibrium sequence for a sufficiently large number of periods, then we can either make sure that after some more time periods the next marginal quality can be chosen relatively far from the present marginal quality and such that all desirable properties are kept (case (b)) or we can reach θ (case (a)). 
The case of small a and δ .
In this section, we construct an equilibrium sequence for the case when a and δ small. It is easy to see that for any value of 1 θ we get ( ) ( )
, and for any generic value of θ , there exist an infinite number of dynamic equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after entering the market.
In order to prove this theorem we only need to show that when
is also possible to construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary large length t where marginal qualities { } t θ are very close to the static equilibrium quality S θ . We will construct a sequence that is strictly decreasing for some time,
, and only the last marginal quality T θ exceeds all previous ones. We denote such a sequence as "equilibrium sequences of type II" and write
In this case our indifference equation (2) becomes the following system:
, then there exist an infinite number of
Note that the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.4 are identical to the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.2.
The General case.
Finally, we prove that for any value of a , we are able to construct infinitely many dynamic equilibria such that all goods in [ ] such that:
The main difference with related Propositions 4.1 and 4.4 is that here the equilibrium sequence constructed around S θ is partly composed of increasing subsequences and partly composed of decreasing subsequences. Therefore, we need to indices ( t and m k ) to keep track of the whole equilibrium sequence.
Note that the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.5 are identical to the conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a different perspective on the way the adverse selection problem may manifest itself in durable good markets, where entry takes place in the same market. In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, adverse selection results in high quality goods not being able to trade despite the potential gains from trade. The infinite repetition of this static equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the dynamic model where a durable good is traded in a competitive market. Our main result in this paper, however, says that there are infinitely many other equilibria where all goods are sold within finite time after entering the market. In each of these dynamic equilibria, the marginal quality that is sold in the first period lies in a small neighborhood of the static equilibrium. This result holds true for all generic values of the parameters governing the behavior of buyers and sellers and the distribution of qualities in the population of sellers.
Vettas, N., 1997. Appendix.
From now on we will use the following notation. 
So, for all sellers with a good of quality less then i θ who are still in the market in a certain period and have not yet traded it is optimal to trade in that period. Thus,
and then it is easy to see that
, it is optimal for the marginal seller t θ to trade in period t and a necessary condition is 0
. Then, we can find a seller i of quality
and t t i ≤ , i.e., he is in the market by period t .
By definition of { } t θ he will trade in period t~. But it can be shown that this is not optimal: 
So, it is not possible that
. We will show that in this case 0
Then it must be 0 
, which is a contradiction.
So, it must be the case that
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Using the fact that ( ) ( )
we express the expected quality sold in period τ in terms of ( )
Now we consider the indifference condition (3) with
. It can be written
The main part of the proof is by induction. At first we will prove that if all conditions to be proved (except 
Suppose that for some
, and
such that for all 
We will prove that then ( ) ( ) 
, where
Let us first consider the left-hand side of the equation (12) as a function 
, ,
Taking all these facts together and applying the intermediate point theorem we can draw the following conclusion. For all
there exists a unique continuous
To prove the rest of step (b) of our induction step, we will now show that ( ) 
Taking the first differentials of this identity w.r.t. 1 θ at
, and using (11), we get: . Taking the derivatives explicitly into account yields
So we can write . Also, as surplus is defined by
Next, we prove part (c) of the induction argument. To this end, we can rewrite (13), using (7) and (8) in the following way: 
Using the induction assumptions, we have Similarly, we can get the following expressions for the first differentials of the
Again, by our induction assumptions we have Subtracting (15) 
We can write the indifference condition (3) as ( )
We can express the above equation in terms of . It can be shown that 
Now again let us consider the indifference equation (3) Taking the first differential w.r.t. 1 θ at S θ and using (19), we get: 
The above inequality implies that ( ) ( ) Finally, using (13), (15) and (16) . The first term of this sequence equals 1. Moreover, the sequence is decreasing with strictly negative increment as ( ) 
Thus, there exists a first negative term of
, which can be denoted by 
, where where g and t F were defined in (9) and (6) correspondingly. Then we get: 
where t K and 1 − t ϕ were defined in (5) and (10) 
(it is always possible as ( ) ( ) But if we take a limit of 1 − t ϕ we get a contradiction:
So, it must be the case that Suppose that for some 
Summing up the indifference equation (3) in a form ( ) , that ends the proof. ¦
Proof of Proposition 4.3.
In all previous analysis we were considering t θ as a function of 1 θ ,
. Now we will consider t θ as a function of 
In the same spirit as before we introduce functions
Taking the limit (22) explicitly 10 yields that the limit actually exists for all
is an arbitrarily small number. Convergence is uniform, hence ( )
is continuous and it follows that ( )
Then we define ( )
on a boundary where . The final result then is straightforward.
11 The expression ( )
is not a limit function any more, but after all derivations have been made those functions will never be evaluated at such points.
The main use of that trick is to substitute complex functions , and at the same time
We will show that 0 ≥ ∃t and
Suppose not, that means that for any 0 ≥ t and any . But this implies that the later has a limit either
. Taking a limit of the indifference equation
gives rise to a contradiction:
So, only two possibilities are left:
The detailed proof of the Cases is on request. We prove that in the Case 1
. In other words in this case there exist infinite number equilibrium sequences such that all goods are traded in the last period.
In the Case 2 we define
Then we prove that either we have the same result as in the Case 1, or for any 0
But in this case we get infinite sequence
, that contradicts with 
In this case we can construct infinite number of dynamic equilibria by concatenating equilibrium sequences, e.g. we take
and let a dynamic equilibrium be the following sequence of marginal sellers: 
Therefore the case when
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
We begin with solving the system of indifference equations (4) 
We will look for such a sequence of functions
. In this case we have
Substituting this into the first differential of (23) such that for all
Given the structure of
we can write: 
Finally we will prove that if t is taken sufficiently large than 0
Let us consider the ratio Suppose we have obtained an equilibrium sequence 
We introduce the following new variable:
In terms of
There exists at least one of such a sequence, namely { } 1 θ , where
Now we will construct a new equilibrium sequence
in the following way.
We will repeat the whole structure of 1 k Θ t times. In other words, for all
Another rule is that for all t , , 2 K = τ ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Taking the first differentials of (25) at S θ θ τ = and using definition of 1 k α (24) we get:
Using the fact that Using the inequality (26) we get:
